I keep thinking of more angles to this Khalil case.
If Khalil’s lawyers invoke Bridges, the government should argue:
Hamas is an illegal terrorist group, not a legal political party.
The national security context is entirely different.
Immigration law has since evolved to make deportation for terrorist ties much easier.
Hamas is an active U.S. enemy, whereas the CPUSA was tied to a then-ally.
Every leftist is now citing Bridges v. Wixon (1945), with respect to the Khalil deportation. They think it makes them sound smart. Leftists always brandish a case they fished out of Justia and think, “Ta-da! I’ve proved my case!” That’s because they’re childish.
Bridges held that a loose association with the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) wasn’t grounds for deportation.
I think the government would have strong counterarguments to distinguish between Bridges and Khalil. Here’s why.
The CPUSA Was Legal1; Hamas Is a Designated Terrorist Organization. Bridges involved the CPUSA, which—despite being a Soviet-aligned party—was not outlawed in 1945. The Court reasoned that loose ties to a legal party was not illegal activity.
Hamas, by contrast, is a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under U.S. law (since 1997). Membership, funding, or material support for an FTO carries clear legal consequences under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (material support statutes).
Bridges was about an ideological association with a legal group; Khalil’s case would involve alleged affiliation with an explicitly illegal organization.
The National Security Context Is Different. In Bridges, the government sought to deport an Australian labor activist on the grounds that he was a CPUSA member who supposedly advocated overthrowing the U.S. government. The Court ruled that “affiliation” alone wasn’t enough—there needed to be clear evidence of intent and action.
If Khalil’s case involves Hamas, the government would likely argue that affiliation alone is enough, given that Congress has already determined that Hamas is a terrorist group. Under Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010), even non-violent support of an FTO is criminalized. Unlike in Bridges, where ideology was the issue, Khalil’s case would likely involve direct statutory prohibitions on Hamas membership or support.
The Standard for Deportation Has Changed Since 1945. Bridges was decided under the Immigration Act of 1918, which had looser definitions for “affiliation” and “membership.”
Modern immigration law under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(3)(B) is much stricter regarding terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility and deportation. The government doesn’t need to prove actual wrongdoing—mere membership or material support is sufficient.
The legal framework today is far more deferential to the government when national security or terrorism concerns are at play.
The U.S. Was Allied with the USSR in 1945; Hamas Is an Ongoing Enemy of the U.S. and Its Allies. In 1945, the CPUSA was a pro-Soviet organization at a time when the U.S. and the USSR were wartime allies. This complicated efforts to portray Bridges as a threat.2
Hamas is an active enemy of the U.S. and Israel, engaged in violent attacks, hostage-taking, and terrorism. The Supreme Court has historically granted the government wide latitude when dealing with security threats.
Bridges was decided in the context of wartime alliances; Khalil’s case would involve an enemy organization engaged in ongoing hostilities.
I conclude that Bridges Is a poor precedent for Khalil’s defense. I welcome their effort to do so, however.
The Supreme Court has historically been deferential to the government in cases involving national security and terrorism (e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project). While Bridges reinforced First Amendment protections against guilt by association, it’s unlikely to offer much protection to someone linked to a legally designated terrorist group.
LAST BUT NOT LEAST - BRIDGES NEVER PREVENTED OTHER AMERICANS FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHTS. Khalil, through CUAD, actively disrupted Columbia students’ ability to attend classes and contributed to a hostile environment for others on campus. While Bridges was accused of a mere ideological association, Khalil’s actions, in the context of Hamas’s terrorist designation, was a direct interference with others' rights — something courts tend to weigh heavily in national security and public order cases.
Let’s have a look at some cases that might be relevant to this.
Healy v. James (1972) dealt with First Amendment rights on college campuses. The Supreme Court emphasized that student organizations cannot disrupt the rights of others or interfere with the school’s educational function. The ruling upheld a college's ability to deny recognition to a group that was suspected of advocating disruptive activity.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010). This one bears repeating. The Court ruled that even non-violent support for a designated terrorist organization—such as providing legal advice—could be criminalized under material support laws. This underscores that affiliation with an FTO carries legal consequences, unlike Bridges, where mere ideological association was insufficient for deportation.
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) specifically dealt with disruptions to education. It ruled that student speech is protected unless it causes substantial disruption. That case set the standard that disruption of a school’s function is a legitimate government concern. In Tinker, the Supreme Court ruled that students do not lose their First Amendment rights at school but that schools can restrict speech if it causes a substantial disruption or materially interferes with the operation of the school.
The threshold was “Substantial Disruption" – The school had to demonstrate that the speech or conduct significantly interferes with school operations.
In Tinker, students wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court found that this was not disruptive because there was no evidence that it caused disorder or prevented students from learning.
The Court rejected the school’s argument that it might lead to disruption, stating that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension” is not enough to justify censorship.
"Invasion of the Rights of Others" – If the speech harasses, intimidates, or prevents others from exercising their rights, it can be restricted.
My non-lawyer interpretation of Tinker is that wearing a keffiyeh3, like wearing a black armband, is perfectly legal, and I would advise people to get over this. But CUAD didn’t just wear keffiyehs. They did everything that Tinker said not to, which I won’t repeat here.
No, I will. I can’t resist — CUAD’s actions went far beyond Tinker’s standard of passive protest. They blocked access to parts of campus, physically disrupted university functions, and fostered an environment where students felt endangered for good reason. These are are all things that courts have historically viewed as material interference rather than protected speech.
Let’s talk megaphones. What pro-Palestinian demonstration would be complete without it? Of course, your local leftist moron will confidently claim their First Amendment right to blast you with slogans through a megaphone.
Nope. Blasting chants and slogans through megaphones adds another layer of material disruption under Tinker. Courts have upheld restrictions on amplified sound in schools and public spaces when it interferes with normal operations.
If students couldn’t focus in class or faculty couldn’t conduct lessons due to CUAD’s noise levels, that’s even more evidence of actual disruption—not just a hypothetical concern like in Tinker. Combined with blocking access to the quad and general campus chaos, the case against Khalil being some kind of Bridges equivalent gets even weaker.
Yes, there are several cases where courts have upheld restrictions on amplified sound in public and educational settings.
Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972)
The Supreme Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance that prohibited loud disturbances near schools during school hours.
The Court ruled that the government has a legitimate interest in preventing disruptions to education and that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on noise are constitutional.
This case would support the argument that CUAD’s megaphones—if they disrupted classes or campus functions—were not protected speech.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989)
The Supreme Court upheld a municipal sound regulation that required concerts in Central Park to use city-provided sound equipment to control noise levels.
The ruling emphasized that reasonable restrictions on amplified sound are constitutional as long as they are content-neutral and serve a legitimate government interest (e.g., preventing disruption).
This strengthens the argument that Columbia (or law enforcement) had the right to restrict CUAD’s megaphones if they were materially interfering with campus order.
If CUAD’s use of megaphones disrupted classes, faculty, or other students’ ability to function on campus, the university and government had a legitimate basis to take action. Courts have consistently ruled that amplified noise can be regulated—especially in schools—without violating the First Amendment.
If Khalil’s lawyers try to frame his actions as “protected speech,” the government could easily argue that disruptive amplified noise is not shielded by the First Amendment, using Grayned and Ward as precedent.
JMO from a non-lawyer. This plus $20 will get you a seat at an NYC movie theater, if you’re crazy enough to pay those prices.
Also: Happy St. Patrick’s Day.
Did you know that? The CPUSA was never a legally proscribed organization. Nor were various Nazi-affiliated groups during WW2.
I think this is very, very, very important. Yes, the CPUSA was always thought of as disloyal and un-American - but they were the mouthpiece of a key ally in a deadly war of survival. Hamas? Not so much. Any lawyer care to disagree with me? Please do.
Wearing a keffiyeh as a mask is a different issue. It’s part of a pattern of intimidation. NYC stupidly revised its anti-masking law (meaning, during political demonstrations, not for medical reasons) due to the Covid insanity and as of March 17, 2025 hasn’t brought it back.
Alas, the snakes have returned to Ireland, and Patrick is nowhere in sight.
I’m reminded of an old joke: what’s three miles long and has an asshole every six feet? The St. Patrick’s Day Parade.